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NOTES
A COMMON-LAW PRIVILEGE FOR STATE
LEGISLATORS IN FEDERAL CRIMINAL
PROSECUTIONS
INTRODUCTION
Article 1, section 6 of the United States Constitution provides
that, "for any Speech or Debate in either House, [Members of
Congress] shall not be questioned in any other Place."' Influenced
by the extended struggle in England between Parliament and the
Crown, 2 the framers of the Constitution adopted the "speech or
debate clause" in order to preserve the independence and integrity
of the federal legislature.3 The clause has been interpreted to pro-
hibit any inquiry outside the Houses of Congress into "legislative
acts" or the motivation behind such acts.4 Thus, the speech or de-
bate clause confers an evidentiary privilege on Congressmen which
may be asserted in both civil and criminal proceedings. 5 The privi-
lege may develop into a substantive immunity when the evidence
protected by the privilege is essential to proving the charges against
the legislator.8 Legislative privilege is so firmly established in Amer-
U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 6, cl. 1.
2 For a discussion of the development of legislative freedom of speech in England, see
C. WITTKE, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH PARLIAMENTARY PRIVILEGE (1921); Cella, The Doctrine of
Legislative Privilege of Freedom of Speech and Debate: Its Past, Present and Future as a Bar
to Criminal Prosecutions in the Courts, 2 SuFFoLK U.L. REV. 1, 3-16 (1968); Reinstein &
Silverglate, Legislative Privilege and the Separation of Powers, 86 HARv. L. REv. 1113, 1120-
44 (1973); Veeder, Absolute Immunity in Defamation: Legislative and Executive Proceedings,
10 COLUM. L. REV. 131, 131-34 (1910); notes 22-27 and accompanying text infra.
See Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 373-74 (1951); note 28 infra.
See Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 615-16 (1972); United States v. Brewster,
408 U.S. 501, 525 (1972); United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169, 180 (1966); Kilbourn v.
Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 204 (1880). For a discussion of the Supreme Court's interpretation
of the scope of the constitutional clause, see notes 37-58 and accompanying text infra.
5 See United States v. Helstoski, 99 S.Ct. 2432, 2438-39 (1979); United States v. Brews-
ter, 408 U.S. 501, 525 (1972); United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169, 184-85 (1966).
1 The substantive immunity resulting from the speech or debate clause applies to civil
actions, see Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 503 (1975); Doe v.
McMillan, 412 U.S. 306, 311-12 (1973); Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 502-03 (1969),
and criminal prosecutions, see United States v. Helstoski, 99 S.Ct. 2432, 2439 (1979); Gravel
v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 624 (1972); United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169, 180 (1966).
Of course, the clause does not immunize congressmen from all civil or criminal prosecution,
but only actions involving legislative acts or the motives for the acts. Thus, legislative acts
may not form the basis of a civil or criminal action nor may the acts be introduced into
evidence. United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 512 (1972); United States v. Johnson, 383
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ican government that, in addition to the federal speech or debate
clause, most state constitutions furnish state legislators with similar
safeguards. 7
Both federal and state courts have created comparable protec-
tion for other officials of the government to enable them to carry out
their duties most effectively.8 This common law doctrine of "official
immunity" bars prosecution of officers for acts performed in the
course of their official duties.9 The doctrine is more restricted than
U.S. 169, 185 (1966); see notes 114-15 and accompanying text infra. See also McGovern v.
Martz, 182 F. Supp. 343, 347 (D.D.C. 1960).
7 Forty-three state constitutions contain provisions conferring a speech or debate privi-
lege on state legislators. ALA. CONST. art. IV, § 56; ALASKA CONST. art. II, § 6; ARIz. CONST.
art. 4 pt. 2, § 7; ARK. CONST. art. 5, § 15; COLO. CONST. art. V, § 16; CONN. CONST. art. 3, §
15; DEL. CONsT. art. II, § 13; GA. CONST. art. III, § V, X11; HAWAII CONST. art. III, § 8; IDAHO
CONST. art. 3, § 7; ILL. CONST. art. 4, § 12; IND. CONST. art. 4, § 8; KAN. CONsT. art. 2, § 22;
Ky. CONST. § 43; LA. CONST. art. 3, § 8; ME. CONST. art. VI, pt. 3, § 8; MD. DECLARATION OF
RIGHTS art. 10 and Mo. CONST. art. I, § 18; MASS. CONST. pt. I, art. XXI; MICH. CONST. art.
IV, § 11; MINN. CONST. art. IV, § 10; Mo. CONST. art. 3, § 19; MONT. CONST. art. V, § 8; NEB.
CONST. art. 3, § 26; N.H. CONST. pt. 1, art. 30; N.J. CONsT. art. 4, § IV, 9; N.M. CONST.
art. 4, § 13; N.Y. CONST. art. 3, § 11; N.D. CONST. art. II, § 42; OHIO CONST. art. II, § 12;
OKLA. CONST. art. 5, § 22; OR. CONST. art. IV, § 9; PA. CONST. art. 2, § 15; R.I. CONST. art, 4,
§ 5; S.D. CONsT. art. I, § 11; TENN. CONST. art. 2, § 13; TEx. CONST. art. 3, § 21; UTAH CONST.
art. VI, § 8; VT. CONST. ch. I, art. 14; VA. CONST. art. IV, § 9; WASH. CONST. art. II, § 17; W.
VA. CONST. art. 6, § 17; WIS. CONST. art. 4, § 16; Wyo. CONsT. art. 3, § 16.
Five states specifically exempt legislators from arrest during a legislative session but do
not confer a constitutional speech or debate privilege. CAL. CONST. art. 4, § 14; IOWA CONST.
art. 3, § 11; MISS. CONST. art. 4, § 48; NEv. CONST. art. 4, § 11; S.C. CONST. art. III, § 14.
Only the Florida and North Carolina Constitutions confer no constitutional protection on
members of the legislature.
See, e.g., Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 241-47 (1974); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547,
553-56 (1967); Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 569-73 (1959); Comment, A Speech or Debate
Privilege for State Legislators Who Violate Federal Criminal Laws?, 68 J. CraM. L. & C. 31,
46 n.146 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Privilege for State Legislators].
I Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 569-70 (1959); Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483, 498-99
(1896). The doctrine of official immunity, at its inception applicable only to judicial officers,
derived from the ancient rule that "the King can do no wrong," the touchstone of sovereign
immunity. Gray, Private Wrongs of Public Servants, 47 CAL. L. REV. 303, 311 (1959). Proceed-
ing from the premise that the King was beyond reproach, it logically followed that those
officials to whom he had delegated the authority to dispense justice similarly were immune
from civil liability. Id. This rationale, however, "hardly acceptable to post-Revolutionary
America," was replaced by a justification of the immunity that emphasized the public benefit
derived therefrom. Id.; see Stewart v. Case, 53 Minn. 62, 67, 54 N.W. 938, 938 (1893); Yates
v. Lansing, 5 Johns. 282, 298 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1810); W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 132, at 987
(4th ed. 1971).
In the United States, official immunity from civil liability has been extended to judges,
Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 553-55 (1967); Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335, 346-47
(1871), executive officials, Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 247-48 (1974); Barr v. Matteo,
360 U.S. 564, 574 (1959), prosecutors, Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 504-08 (1978); Imbler
v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 431 (1976), and school-board members, Wood v. Strickland, 420
U.S. 308, 322 (1975).
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the speech or debate privilege, however, because it applies only in
civil actions0 and sometimes provides only a qualified immunity."
Another possible source of protection is a common-law eviden-
tiary privilege. All evidentiary privileges in federal civil and crimi-
nal actions are governed by Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence (Rule 501), 12 which provides that the existence of a privilege
must be determined in accordance with "the principles of the com-
mon law as they may be interpreted by the courts of the United
States in the light of reason and experience."' 3 When a state legisla-
10 See, e.g., Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 429 (1976); O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S.
488, 503 (1974); Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 627 (1972).
11 Unlike the speech or debate privilege which affords absolute immunity to legislators
for their legislative acts, Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 503
(1975), the doctrine of official immunity confers only a qualified immunity on some officials,
provided they act in good faith, e.g., Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 321 (1975) (school-
board members); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 555-57 (1967) (police officers). Although at
one time the law was settled that high ranking executive officials possessed absolute immun-
ity, see Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 571 (1959), later pronouncements from the Supreme
Court, see Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 322 (1975); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232,
247-48 (1974), created considerable uncertainty as to the standard of immunity to be applied
to federal executive officers. See Note, Federal Executive Immunity from Civil Liability in
Damages: A Reevaluation of Barr v. Matteo, 77 COLUm. L. REv. 625, 625 (1977). Most re-
cently, in Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478 (1978), the Supreme Court, while not expressly
overruling Barr, held that where a constitutional violation was involved, federal executive
officials were entitled only to a qualified immunity, except in "exceptional situations where
it is demonstrated that absolute immunity is essential for the conduct of the public business."
Id. at 507 (footnote omitted).
12 FED. R. EVID. 501. Under the supremacy clause of the United States Constitution, U.S.
CONST. art. VI, cl. 2, the Federal Rules of Evidence supercede all state statutory and constitu-
tional evidentiary provisions. See Reina v. United States, 364 U.S. 507, 512 (1960) (citing
Adams v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 179, 183 
(1954)).
11 Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, in pertinent part, provides:
Except as otherwise required by the Constitution of the United States or provided
by Act of Congress or in rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statu-
tory authority, the privilege of a witness, person, government, State, or political
subdivision thereof shall be governed by the principles of the common law as they
may be interpreted by the courts of the United States in the light of reason and
experience.
Rule 501, the only codification in the Federal Rules of Evidence to deal with the subject
of privilege, see S. SALTZBURG & K. REDDEN, FEDERAL RULEs OF EVIDENCE MANUAL 198 (2d ed.
1977) became effective on July 1, 1975, and was derived from Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure, 10 MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTIcE § 501.0411] (2d ed. 1979). Prior to the
adoption of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure in 1944, the standards for determining
the controlling law in federal criminal prosecutions, including rules of evidence, were mud-
dled by "a maze of ambiguous and conflicting judicial and legislative pronouncements."
Howard, Evidence in Federal Criminal Trials, 51 YALE L.J. 763, 763 (1942). The Supreme
Court early had held that the Rules of Decision Act, ch. 20, § 34, 1 Stat. 73 (1789) (current
version at 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1976)), which directed the federal courts to use the evidentiary
laws of the states unless the Constitution or a federal statute provided otherwise, did not
apply to criminal proceedings. United States v. Reid, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 361, 363 (1851). The
1979]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
tor is sued or prosecuted in federal court, the courts have had diffi-
culty in determining the extent if any to which a legislative privilege
attaches. Although the Supreme Court has granted state legislators
a "legislative privilege" when sued for damages in federal court
under section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act," whether the "privilege"
was founded in the constitutional speech or debate clause or the
common-law official immunity doctrine was not made clear. 5 Re-
cently, a conflict has developed among the circuit courts of appeals
concerning whether a federal common-law legislative privilege ex-
ists for state legislators prosecuted on federal criminal charges.,
As the Supreme Court contemplates the issue for the first
time,'" this Note will explore the problems involved in adopting a
federal common-law privilege. The origin and judicial development
of the speech or debate clause of the United States Constitution will
be discussed to the extent necessary to define its general scope and
contemporary justifications. 8 The conflicting arguments advanced
in circuit court cases that have considered the legislative privilege
question will be examined in detail. 9 The Note will then demon-
strate that neither the constitutional privilege as construed by the
Supreme Court, nor its historical roots, prohibit state legislators
from receiving protection in federal criminal actions." Finally, the
role the state governments play in our federal system will be studied
Reid Court determined that the law of evidence of the forum state, as it was in 1789, con-
trolled criminal actions. Id. at 363, 366. If the forum state had not been admitted into the
Union in 1789, the law existing on the date of admission applied. Logan v. United States,
144 U.S. 263, 303 (1892). Subsequent cases, however, relaxed the rule of strict insistence on
conformity to local law. See Wolfle v. United States, 291 U.S. 7, 12-13 (1934); Funk v. United
States, 290 U.S. 371, 379, 382 (1933). Finally, it was statutorily mandated, through Rule 26
of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence,
that the admissibility of evidence in federal criminal prosecutions would be determined by
federal law and not state law. See United States v. Craig, 528 F.2d 773, 776 (7th Cir.),
modified per curiam, 537 F.2d 957 (7th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 999 (1976).
State rules of evidence now apply only in those civil proceedings where "[s]tate law supplies
the rule of decision." FED. R. EviD. 501.
" Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 378-79 (1951); see notes 41-51 and accompanying
text infra.
15 See notes 49-51 and accompanying text infra.
" See United States v. Gillock, 587 F.2d 284 (6th Cir. 1978), cert. granted, 99 S.Ct. 2159
(1979); United States v. DiCarlo, 565 F.2d 802 (1st Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 924
(1978); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 563 F.2d 577 (3d Cir. 1977); United States v. Craig,
528 F.2d 773, modified per curiam, 537 F.2d 957 (7th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
999 (1976); notes 60-103 and accompanying text infra.
17The Supreme Court recently granted certiorari in United States v. Gillock. 99 S.Ct.
2159 (1979), granting cert. to 587 F.2d 284 (6th Cir. 1978).
" See notes 22-59 and accompanying text infra.
1' See notes 60-100 and accompanying text infra.
See notes 101-129 and accompanying text infra.
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in order to establish the necessity for conferring the benefits of an
evidentiary privilege, similar to the speech or debate clause, on state
legislators in the criminal context."
THE ORIGIN OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL PRIVILEGE
The legislative speech or debate privilege in the United States
was the product of the sixteenth and early seventeenth century
power contests between Parliament and the Crown.2 Parliament,
traditionally recognized as the highest court of the land, gradually
sought to assert its rights as the lawmaker.2 3 The Crown, however,
restricted parliamentary attempts to initiate legislation. Members
of Parliament who dared to question the authority, judgment, or
policies of the Crown were subjected to various forms of intimida-
tion, including arrest and imprisonment.2 4 To deal with the repres-
sive actions, Parliament repeatedly requested the Crown to recog-
nize its right to free speech in debate and passed legislation nullify-
ing all prosecutions arising from parliamentary proceedings.26 Fi-
nally, in 1689 parliamentary freedom of speech and debate was
incorporated into the English Bill of Rights," thereby assuming an
unassailable position in English law.
The engineers of the American Government, well aware of the
need to prevent threats of litigation or imprisonment from deterring
2' See notes 130-42 and accompanying text infra.
2 See authorities cited in note 2 supra.
2 See Cella, supra note 2, at 4; Reinstein & Silverglate, supra note 2, at 1122, 1126;
Veeder, supra note 2, at 132.
24 See C. WrrrKE, supra note 2, at 23-29; Cella, supra note 2, at 6-11; Reinstein &
Silverglate, supra note 2, at 1126-27; Veeder, supra note 2, at 132-33.
21 An official request to recognize the privilege of freedom of speech in Parliament had
been made to the Crown as early as 1541. Cella, supra note 2, at 6.
Privilege of Parliament Act, 1512, 4 Hen. 8, c. 8. The law was passed in response to
the conviction of Richard Strode, a member of the House of Commons, for interfering with
tin mining by introducing bills to regulate the trade. The Privilege of Parliament Act specifi-
cally annulled Strode's conviction and called for his release, in addition to declaring void all
similar future prosecutions. See C. WirrrE, supra note 2, at 25 n.16; Cella, supra'note 2, at
6; Veeder, supra note 2, at 132 n.5.
21 Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 372 (1951). The English Bill of Rights provision
stated "[ihat the freedom of speech, and debates, and proceedings in Parliament, ought
not to be impeached or questioned in any court or place out of Parliament." I W. & M. sess.
2, c.2 (1689); see Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 202 (1880); Stockdale v. Hansard, 112
Eng. Rep. 1112, 1140 (1839). The English Parliamentary privilege was construed frequently
in the nineteenth century. See Cella, supra note 2, at 12. In Ex parte Wason, [1869] L.R. 4
Q.B. 573, the court held that a conspiracy to make false statements in the legislature was
not a prosecutable offense under English law. Id. at 573-74. Mr. Justice Lush noted: "[T]he
motives or intentions of members of either House cannot be inquired into by criminal pro-
ceedings with respect to anything they may do or say in the House." Id. at 577.
1979]
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or intimidating legislators in the performance of their duties, in-
cluded the doctrine of legislative privilege in both the Articles of
Confederation and the Constitution without significant debate. 2 At
the time the Constitution was drafted, three state constitutions con-
tained similar provisions.29 The first court in the United States to
address legislative privilege was the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts in Coffin v. Coffin."0 Described by one commentator
See Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 373-74 (1951); Cella, supra note 2, at 13;
Reinstein & Silverglate, supra note 2, at 1138-39; Privilege for State Legislators, supra note
8, at 38. The sentiment of the Framers was probably best summarized by James Wilson, who
was a member of the committee from which the constitutional provision emerged.
In order to enable and encourage a representative of the public to discharge
his public trust with firmness and success, it is indispensably necessary, that he
should enjoy the fullest liberty of speech, and that he should be protected from the
resentment of every one, however powerful, to whom the exercise of that liberty may
occasion offence.
I WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 38 (J. Andrews ed. 1896).
Article 5 of the Articles of Confederation provided: "Freedom of Speech and debate in
Congress shall not be impeached or questioned in any court or place out of Congress . "
Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 372 (1951). No record of any debate on the language,
scope, or purpose of the Articles of Confederation provision has been found. See Reinstein &
Silverglate, supra note 2, at 1136 n.122. Similarly, the speech or debate privilege was adopted
unanimously at the Constitutional Convention. Cella, supra note 2, at 14. Two minor modifi-
cations were proposed but never adopted: the first, by William Pinckney, suggested that the
respective Houses of Congress should be the exclusive interpreters of the scope of the privi-
lege, and the second, by James Madison, proposed that the scope of the privilege be deline-
ated. Id. at 14-15.
" Although the speech or debate privilege apparently was not recognized in the early
colonial charters, see D. WATSON, THE CONSTrrUTroN OF THE UNITED STATES 324 (1910), three
state constitutions expressly conferred the privilege on state legislators before the federal
Constitution was adopted. Maryland's Constitution, adopted in 1776, stated "Etihat free-
dom of speech, and debates or proceedings, in the legislature, ought not to be impeached in
any other court or judicature." MD. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, art. VIII. The Massachusetts and
New Hampshire constitutions, MASS. CONST. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, art. 21 (1780); N.H.
CONST. pt. 1, art. 30 (1784), contained virtually identical grants of legislative privilege. See
generally Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 373-74 (1951). Two other states, South Carolina
and New Jersey, constitutionally provided for legislative privilege by specifically preserving
English law. Id. at 374 n.3.
4 Mass. 1 (1808). Coffin was a defamation action brought by one member of the
Massachusetts House of Representatives against another representative. The plaintiff, Wil-
liam Coffin, had asked Benjamin Russell, a fellow legislator, to introduce a resolution author-
izing the appointment of another notary public in Nantucket. Id. at 3-4. After the resolution
had been passed, the defendant, Micajah Coffin, questioned Russell in the hallway of the
House about the source of the information behind the resolution. Id. at 4. When Russell
indicated that it was William Coffin, the defendant exclaimed "What, that convict?", an
obvious reference to the plaintiffs previous prosecution for bank robbery. Id. When reminded
that he had been acquitted of the charges, Micajah replied, "That did not make him the less
guilty. ... Id. Although the defendant did not deny making the statement, at trial he
contended that it was justifiable under the speech or debate clause of the Massachusetts
constitution. Id.
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as "the classic American formulation,""1 the Coffin decision was to
profoundly affect interpretations of the federal speech or debate
clause.3 2 The Coffin court concluded that the privilege embodied in
the Massachusetts constitutionl existed not for the personal benefit
of the legislators but "to support the rights of the people" by allow-
ing elected representatives to discharge their official responsibilities
without fear of civil or criminal liability. 4 The Coffin court deter-
mined that it was necessary to construe the privilege liberally in
order to effectuate its purposes. 5 In addition to legislative speech,
therefore, the court found that the privilege applied to every act
"resulting from the nature, and in the execution of the office.""
Perhaps indicative of the extent to which the doctrine of legisla-
tive freedom of speech had been entrenched in the American system
of government, more than 90 years after its incorporation into the
Constitution had passed until the Supreme Court was called upon
to interpret the scope of the federal legislative privilege. Kilbourn
v. Thompson3' was a civil action for false imprisonment against the
members of a House of Representatives investigative committee
that had ordered the plaintiff's arrest for his refusal to testify
22 Celia, supra note 2, at 18.
32 Even though Coffin involved the interpretation of a state provision, broader in lang-
uage than the federal speech or debate clause, compare MAss. CONST. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS,
art. 21 (1780) with U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 6, cl. 1, it has been cited by the Supreme Court in at
least five cases construing the scope of the federal clause. See Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 99
S.Ct. 2675, 2683 (1979); United States v. Helstoski, 99 S.Ct. 2432, 2441 (1979); Gravel v.
United States, 408 U.S. 606, 660 (1972) (Brennan, J., dissenting); United States v. Brewster,
408 U.S. 501, 513, 515 (1972); Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 203 (1880). See also
Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 373-74 (1951). Coffin also has been cited by two of the
circuit courts of appeals while addressing the issue whether a common-law speech or debate
privilege exists. See United States v. Gillock, 587 F.2d 284, 293 n.10 (6th Cir. 1978), cert.
granted, 99 S.Ct. 2159 (1979); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 563 F.2d 577, 583 (3d Cir. 1977).
MASS. CONsT. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, art. 21 (1780).
' 4 Mass. at 27.
5Id.
u Id. The Court stated:
[Legislative privilege is secured] not with the intention of protecting the members
against prosecutions for their own benefit, but to support the rights of the people,
by enabling their representatives to execute the functions of their office without fear
of prosecutions, civil or criminal. I therefore think that the article ought not to be
construed strictly, but liberally . . . . I will . . . extend it to . . .every . . . act
resulting from the nature, and in the execution, of the office; and I would define
the article as securing to every member exemption from prosecution, for everything
said or done by him, as a representative, in the exercise of the functions of that
office. ...
Id. Despite the undeniably liberal construction given the clause by the court, it was found
not to apply in Coffin. Id. at 30-31.
- 103 U.S. 168 (1880). '
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before the committee.38 The Court held that the Representatives
were not liable even though they had no power to authorize the
arrest.39 Citing Coffin, the Kilbourn Court held that, in addition
to oral expression, the speech or debate clause protected "things
generally done in a session of the House by one of its members in
relation to the business before it." '40
Seventy years later, the Supreme Court again focused on the
speech or debate clause in Tenney v. Brandhove,4' a civil suit
against state legislators under section 1983 of the Civil Rights Acts.42
In Tenney, the plaintiff commenced the action after being cited for
contempt for refusing to testify before a California senate investiga-
tory committee.43 Addressing the state senators' claim of legislative
privilege,44 it was found that the privilege guarantees "the fullest
liberty of speech [in order to] protec[t] [individual legislators]
from the resentment of every one, however powerful, to whom the
exercise of that liberty may occasion offence ." 5 The Court con-
cluded that Congress had not intended to abrogate this privilege
when it passed the Civil Rights Acts.4 Determining that the con-
" Id. at 170-73. Also named as defendant was Thompson, the Sergeant-at-Arms who
effectuated the arrest. Id. at 170,
Id. at 199-200.
Id. at 203-04. Despite its liberal interpretation of the range of activity contemplated
by the clause, the Kilbourn Court restricted the application of the privilege to the legislators
themselves, holding that the constitutional provisions did not protect the Sergeant-at-Arms
who had carried out the illegal arrest. Id. at 205. The Kilbourn decision has been criticized
on the ground that exclusion of the actual arrest from the scope of the privilege nullified
whatever protection had been afforded to the congressional act ordering the arrest. See Cella,
The Doctrine of Legislative Privilege of Speech and Debate: The New Interpretation as a
Threat to Legislative Coequality, 8 SUFFOLK U.L. Rav. 1019, 1060, 1062 (1974).
41 341 U.S. 367 (1951).
12 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976). The action also was based on § 1985(c) of the Civil Rights
Acts. 341 U.S. at 369. These statutes provide a civil remedy against anyone who deprives,
id. § 1983, or conspires to deprive another person of his constitutional rights, id. § 1985(c).
41 341 U.S. at 370-71. Brandhove had circulated a petition in the California legislature
seeking to prevent funding of the Senate Fact-Finding Committee on Un-American Activi-
ties, of which Tenney was the head. Id. at 370. When the committee called Brandhove to
explain the charges made in his petition, he refused to testify. Id. Claiming damages in excess
of $10,000, Brandhove alleged that the committee hearing "was not held for a legislative
purpose" but rather '"to intimidate and silence [him] and deter and prevent him from
effectively exercising his constitutional rights of free speech and to petition the Legislature
for redress of grievances." Id. at 371.
" See id. at 372-78. The Court analyzed the origins and purposes of the speech or debate
clauses of the United States Constitution and of the three states whose constitutional privi-
leges predated the federal provision. Id. at 372-75. It is important to note, however, that
California had no constitutional speech or debate protection at that time. See id. at 375 n.5;
notes 44-45 and accompanying text infra.
Id. at 373 (quoting II WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 38 (J. Andrews ed. 1896)).
341 U.S. at 376.
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duct of the state senate investigatory committee had been "within
the sphere of legislative activity,"47 the Tenney Court held that the
defendants were not liable. 8
Tenney is the only case in which the Supreme Court has consid-
ered the safeguards available to state legislators in federal actions.
The Court devoted much discussion to the federal speech or debate
clause and the constitutionally-guaranteed legislative privileges rec-
ognized in states outside of California but never specified the source
of the defense asserted by the California state senators. 49 Rather, the
Court merely attached the generic label "legislative privilege" to
the protection.50 This ambiguity has led some authorities, including
the Court itself, to the conclusion that the Tenney Court conferred
a common law immunity, and not a speech or debate privilege, on
the state senators in order to exempt them from section 1983 liabil-
ity.51
In United States v. Johnson,5- the Supreme Court interpreted
the speech or debate clause in the context of a criminal suit for the
first time. In order to prove that a Congressman had engaged in a
conspiracy to defraud the United States, the government sought to
establish that the Member was paid to deliver a speech in the House
of Representatives favorable to savings and loan associations. 3 The
a Id. at 376-78. The Tenney Court concluded that "[t]he claim of unworthy purpose
[would] not destroy the privilege" if the legislator otherwise was acting within the legislative
area. Id. at 377. Questioning the motives of the legislator, stated the Court, would signifi-
cantly undermine the purposes of the privilege. Id.
11 Id. at 378-79. Under the Tenney holding, it would appear that the defendant state
legislators were absolutely immune from civil suit under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985(c) (1976).
See 341 U.S. at 379. See also Lake Country Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency,
99 S.Ct. 1171, 1180 (1979); Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 318 (1975); Scheuer v. Rhodes,
416 U.S. 232, 247-48 (1974); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 557 (1967).
1' See 341 U.S. at 372-75; note 44 supra.
50 341 U.S. at 378.
51 Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 316 (1975); Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306, 319 n.13
(1973); United States v. Gillock, 587 F.2d 284, 297 (6th Cir. 1978) (Weick, J., dissenting),
cert. granted, 99 S.Ct. 2159 (1979); United States v. Craig, 528 F.2d 773, 782 (7th Cir.) (Tone,
J., concurring), modified per curiam, 537 F.2d 957 (7th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 429
U.S, 999 (1976). The Supreme Court recently has stated in dicta that the United States
Constitutional speech or debate clause provides no protection for state legislators. Lake
Country Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 99 S.Ct. 1171, 1179 (1979). But
see Eslinger v. Thomas, 476 F.2d 225 (4th Cir. 1973). This observation, however, does
not preclude the recognition of a federal common-law speech or debate privilege for state
legislators.
52 383 U.S. 169 (1966).
n 383 U.S. at 171-72. Johnson, a former member of the United States House of Repre-
sentatives, was charged with violating the federal conflict of interest statute, 18 U.S.C. § 281
(1976), and with conspiring to defraud the United States, 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1976), by attempt-
ing to procure the dismissal of mail fraud indictments against a lending company and its
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Court concluded that the initiation of criminal charges against a
critical legislator by an unfriendly executive was the main reason for
adopting a parliamentary privilege in England and, "in the context
of the American system of separation of powers, [was] the predom-
inant thrust of the Speech or Debate Clause."54 Relying on Kilbourn
and Tenney, the Johnson Court stated that "the legislative privilege
will be read broadly to effectuate [this] purpos[e]." 5 The Court
held, therefore, that the speech or debate clause of the United
States Constitution prohibited the government not only from intro-
ducing the Congressman's speech into evidence, but also from in-
quiring into his motivations for giving the speech.56
Despite the Court's initial willingness to extend broadly the
scope of the constitutional privilege,57 recent cases indicate that the
Court is taking a more restricted approach. 8 Nevertheless, its pro-
officers. 383 U.S. at 171. The speech allegedly was part of the conspiracy and, as the Court
noted, the prosecution's case depended upon proof that the speech was made for an improper
purpose. Id. at 175-77.
" 383 U.S. at 182.
Id. at 180.
5 Id. at 177-85. The Court concluded that, since the theory of the government required
proof that Johnson's speech was improperly motivatpd, the speech or debate clause pro-
scribed the prosecution. Id. at 180, 184-85. Expressly limiting its holding to the situation
involved in the Johnson case, the Court indicated that a criminal prosecution could proceed
against the Congressman provided his acts or motivations are not brought into question. Id.
at 185. The Court, therefore, remanded the case to allow the government to attempt to
establish the conspiracy through the use of other evidence. Id. The Supreme Court repeatedly
has held that the speech or debate clause shields from inquiry legislators' motives or inten-
tions. See Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 508 (1975); United
States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 525 (1972); Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 377 (1951).
See also United States v. Doe, 455 F.2d 753, 758 (1st Cir.), aff'd in part sub nom. Gravel v.
United States, 408 U.S. 606 (1972); McGovern v. Martz, 182 F. Supp. 343, 346 (D.D.C. 1960).
" See Cella, supra note 40, at 1047-48; notes 37-56 and accompanying text supra. See
also Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969); Dombrowski v. Eastland, 387 U.S. 82 (1967).
11 In United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501 (1972), the Court held that, rather than
protecting everything "within the sphere of legislative activity," Tenney v. Brandhove, 341
U.S. 367, 376 (1951), the speech or debate clause only extends to acts that are "clearly a part
of the legislative process-the due functioning of the process," 408 U.S. at 516. The Brewster
Court concluded, therefore, that the speech or debate clause does not prohibit the prosecution
of a Congressman for accepting a bribe in exchange for doing an official act, insofar as the
government would not have to rely on legislative acts or motivations for those acts to prove
that the Senator had taken the bribe. Id. at 525-29. It is important to note, however, that
Brewster differed factually from United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169 (1966), where a
conspiracy prosecution depended on establishing that a speech made by the defendant Con-
gressman was improperly motivated. Id. at 180; note 53 supra. The Johnson Court found the
prosecution barred by the constitutional clause. Id. Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606
(1972), another case restricting the scope of the clause, concerned a grand jury investigation
of the disclosure of the celebrated Pentagon Papers. Id. at 608. The issue was whether the
Senator's aide could be compelled to testify before a grand jury concerning the release and
republication of the papers after the Senator had revealed a large part of their contents at a
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tection is undoubtedly broader than that provided by the common-
law official immunity doctrine since the privilege can be asserted in
both civil and criminal proceedings." Thus, it has become crucial
to determine whether the protections afforded a state legislator in
a federal criminal prosecution, in the form of a federal common-law
privilege under Rule 501, are commensurate with the safeguards
supplied by common-law immunity or by the speech or debate
clause of the United States Constitution.
THE CONFLICT AMONG THE CIRCUITS
The seventh circuit was the first court to confront the issue in
United States v. Craig," a prosecution of several state legislators for
extortion and related offenses."' After testifying under subpoena be-
fore a grand jury investigating the charges, one of the legislators
raised the state and federal speech or debate clauses in an effort to
suppress the grand jury testimony at his subsequent criminal trial. 2
The district court ruled that the state legislator was protected by
the Illinois constitutional privilege. 3
Senate subcommittee meeting. Id. at 608-10. Although the Court determined that a Congress-
man's aide may invoke the speech or debate clause for acts that would be protected had they
been done by the legislator himself, id. at 616-17, it adopted a narrow interpretation of the
privilege, id. at 622-27. The Court declared that, to come within the scope of the protection,
legislative acts "must be an integral part of the deliberative and communicative process by
which Members participate in committee and House proceedings with respect to the consider-
ation and passage or rejection of proposed legislation or with respect to matters which the
Constitution places within the jurisdiction of either House." Id. at 625. The Court concluded
that the alleged arrangement to republish the Pentagon Papers was not "an integral part of
the [legislative] process" and could be questioned without threatening the independence of
the legislature. Id. at 625. Thus, neither Senator Gravel nor his assistant could invoke the
speech or debate clause to quash the grand jury subpoena. See id. at 626.
Recent Supreme Court interpretations of the constitutional privilege in civil actions
similarly have indicated the Court's willingness to limit the extent or the effect of the privi-
lege. See Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 99 S.Ct. 2675 (1979); Eastland v. United States Service-
men's Fund, 421 U.S. 491 (1975); Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306 (1973); cf. United States v.
Helstoski, 99 S.Ct. 2432 (1979) (criminal prosecution).
The Court's narrow construction of the constitutional speech or debate clause has been
criticized as undermining the ability of the clause to fulfill its intended functions. See Ervin,
The Gravel and Brewster Cases: An Assault on Congressional Independence, 59 VA. L. Rv.
175 (1973); Reinstein & Silverglate, supra note 2, at 1148-71; Comment, Brewster, Gravel and
Legislative Immunity, 73 COLuM. L. Rxv. 125 (1973).
"' See notes 9-11 and accompanying text supra.
60 528 F.2d 773, modified per curiam, 537 F.2d 956 (7th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 999 (1976).
"1 The Craig defendants were charged with violating the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951
(1976), an anti-corruption measure, and the Mail Fraud Statute, id. § 1341. 528 F.2d at 774.
62 528 F.2d at 774. The wording of the state provision was substantially identical to the
federal provision. Compare U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 6, cl. 1, with ILL. CONsT. art. 4, § 12.
1 528 F.2d at 774.
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On appeal, a divided seventh circuit panel disagreed with the
lower court's conclusion that the state constitutional privilege was
applicable to a federal criminal prosecution64 but nevertheless deter-
mined that a federal common-law privilege could be invoked by the
state legislator.6 5 The court rejected the government's contention
that, since the privilege was designed to preserve the separation of
powers among coequal branches of government, it does not apply
when a state legislator is questioned by the federal executive be-
cause the supremacy of the national government precludes the ex-
istence of a separation of powers controversy.66 The court main-
tained that the government's argument overlooked the federal na-
ture of the American system whereby the powers not specifically
granted to the national government are retained by the individual
states. 7 On matters of local concern, the court reasoned that state
legislatures play as important a role in state government as Con-
gress plays in governing the entire nation." Finding the primary
purpose of the speech or debate privilege to be to allow legislators
to carry out their obligations freely and without intimidation by
other governmental units, the Craig court concluded that the chill-
ing effect on the legislators would be the same whether the threat
of executive interference originated at the national or state level."9
As a result, the court found a federal common-law speech or debate
privilege pursuant to Rule 501 necessary in federal prosecutions of
state legislators to preserve the independence of the legislatures of
The majority, after an extensive discussion of the history of Rule 501, which governs
privileges in federal actions, see note 13, supra, found that "'federal privilege law applies in
criminal cases.'" 528 F.2d at 776, (quoting CONF. REP. No. 93-1597, 93d Cong., 2d sess. 7,
reprinted in [19741 4 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws, 7098, 7100).
11 528 F.2d at 779. The conclusion that a common-law privilege could be invoked was
predicated in part on the legislative history of Rule 501, which was found to indicate no
intention "to override the common law privilege inherent in the Speech or Debate Clause of
the federal and state constitutions." Id. at 776. As the Craig court noted, the original draft
of Article V of the Federal Rules of Evidence expressly limited the privileges the federal courts
were required to recognize. In addition to nine listed privileges were those either constitution-
ally or statutorily mandated. Id.; see S. SALTZBERG & K. REDDEN, supra note 13, at 200. Since
this would have abolished or modified common-law privileges, the original draft was vigor-
ously opposed. 528 F.2d at 776. As a consequence, Congress eliminated the enumeration of
the privileges and enacted Rule 501, preserving federal common-law privileges in criminal
actions. See note 13 supra. This apparent attempt to placate the critics of the more explicit
provisions contained in the preliminary draft has been criticized on the ground that the rules
of privilege "are left in the confused state they were in prior to the enactment of the Rules."
S. SALTZBERG & K. REDDEN, supra note 13, at 201.






the several states.70 The seventh circuit reversed the district court's
suppression order, however, on the ground that the senator had
waived his speech or debate privilege when he testified before the
grand jury.7'
In an opinion concurring in result only, Judge Tone disputed
the majority's recognition of a federal common-law speech or debate
privilege for state legislators.72 Relying on Tenney v. Brandhove,73
he stated that the protection enjoyed by state legislators prosecuted
in federal court was limited to immunity from civil suit under the
doctrine of official immunity. 74 Reasoning that the existence of an
evidentiary privilege depends upon whether there is an analogous
substantive immunity, Judge Tone concluded that there could be
no substantive immunity because this was a criminal case and there
was no justification for granting the state legislator a testimonial
privilege. 75 Judge Tone supported his conclusion by interpreting the
purposes of the constitutional speech or debate clause and the
common-law official immunity doctrine.76 He found that the latter
was adopted by the courts to enable government officials to perform
their duties without the threat of litigation,77 which was satisfied by
70 Id. at 779.
7, Id. at 781. The court stated that the speech or debate privilege is waivable by an
individual legislator only when the inquiry does not affect the independence of the other
members. Id. at 780. According to the court, waiver need not be "knowing and intelligent."
Id. at 781; see Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938). Rather, the waiver must be the
'"'product of an essentially free and unconstrained choice by its maker,"" 528 F.2d at 781
(quoting Schenckloth v. Bustamonte, 413 U.S. 218, 225 (1973)), since the policy served by
the privilege is unrelated to the fairness of the trial, 528 F.2d at 781. The United States
Supreme Court recently addressed the issue of the appropriate standard of waiver of the
privilege conferred by the federal speech or debate clause in United States v. Helstoski, 99
S.Ct. 2432, 2440 (1979).
" 528 F.2d at 781.
- 341 U.S. 367 (1951).
1' 528 F.2d at 782. The Supreme Court, in three recent cases dealing with the liability of
state officials pursuant to § 1983 of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976), has
discussed Tenney in the context of official immunity. See Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308,
316-18 (1975); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 243-44 (1974); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547,
553-55 & n.9 (1967); Judge Tone contended that the Supreme Court's alignment of Tenney
with these later official immunity cases indicated that the Court would read Tenney to
foreclose the extension of a common-law speech or debate privilege to state legislators. 528
F.2d at 782; see Privilege for State Legislators, supra note 8, at 50.
15 528 F.2d at 782-83; note 10, supra. The proposition that the granting of an evidentiary
privilege should be precluded in the absence of a substantive immunity was cited with
approval in United States v. DiCarlo, 565 F.2d 802 (1st Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 924
(1978), wherein the first circuit stated: "If there is 'no limitation on . . .enforcement,' we
see no basis for creating a limitation that handicaps proof." Id. at 807. But see note 112 and
accompanying text infra.
7' 528 F.2d at 782-83.
Id. at 783.
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immunizing officials from civil liability only.7 On the other hand,
the speech or debate clause provides Congressmen more extensive
protection in order to preserve the separation of powers in the fed-
eral government. 79 To achieve this result, Judge Tone reasoned,
Congressmen also must be safeguarded from intimidation by the
executive branch.80 On rehearing en banc, Judge Tone's concurring
rationale was endorsed without further explication by a majority of
the seventh circuit.8'
Subsequently, the first circuit, in an opinion which relied ex-
tensively on the rationale of the Craig concurrence, unanimously
refused to extend a common-law evidentiary privilege to state legis-
lators in federal criminal prosecutions. 2 A divided third circuit,
however, indicated that it agreed with the decision of the Craig




81 537 F.2d 957, 958 (7th Cir.) (en banc) (per curiam), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 999 (1976).
On rehearing en banc, Judge Cummings, author of the panel majority opinion, and Judge
Swygert maintained that a common-law speech or debate privilege exists and should be
recognized. Chief Judge Fairchild subscribed to the position that federal courts are required
to recognize state constitutional privileges because of "the constitutional relationship be-
tween the states and the United States." !d. at 958-59.
11 United States v. DiCarlo, 565 F.2d 802 (1st Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 924
(1978). DiCarlo involved the prosecution of Massachusetts state senators for conspiracy to
violate the Hobbs Act and other federal laws. Id. at 803. In summarily disposing of the claim
of privilege, the court indicated that the only protection from federal liability available to a
state legislator was afforded by the doctrine of official immunity which applies only to civil
actions. Id. at 806. The first circuit was not dissuaded by the defendants' contention that
the federal nature of American government required an extension to state legislators of the
safeguards that are similar to those enjoyed by Congressmen under the speech or debate
clause. Id. Noting that the instant prosecution involved issues of "federal supremacy," the
court held that "the federal-state relationship [could not override] the government's need
of evidence of federal crime." Id.
8 In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 563 F.2d 577, 583 (3d Cir. 1977). Grand Jury Proceedings
involved an attempt by a Pennsylvania state senator and the chief clerk of the senate to
intervene in the federal government's enforcement of subpoenas duces tecum. Id. at 579. The
court initially determined that the constitutional speech or debate clause did not apply to
state legislators since the clause has significance only when separation of powers is involved
and no such problem exists when a state legislator is prosecuted for a federal crime. Id. at
580-81. Nevertheless, emphasizing that state legislators perform extremely important func-
tions, id., the third circuit found it necessary to recognize a federal common-law privilege in
order to foreclose the possibility that state legislators would be hindered by a threat of
prosecution based on their official conduct, id. at 583. The court ruled, however, that the
common-law privilege did not protect any of the evidence sought by the subpoenas. Id. at
585. The court indicated that the same restrictions imposed by the Supreme Court on the
constitutional clause, see notes 57-58 and accompanying text supra, also would apply to the
common-law privilege. 563 F.2d at 584-85. A concurring opinion disagreed with the majority's
discussion of a federal common-law privilege. Id. at 586-88 (Gibbons, J., concurring). At the
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Against this divided background, the sixth circuit, in United
States v. Gillock, I decided the most recent case on point. Defendant
Gillock, a Tennessee state senator, was charged with soliciting and
accepting a bribe 'under color of official right"' in exchange for his
efforts in an official capacity to prevent an extradition, a violation
of the Hobbs Act.'5 During the course of the trial, Gillock filed a
motion to suppress all of the evidence bearing upon his activities as
a state legislator on the ground that he possessed a common-law
speech or debate privilege under Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of
Evidence.86 The motion was granted by the district court."
A divided sixth circuit affirmed, ruling that a common-law
speech or debate privilege is available to protect state legislators in
federal prosecutions.88 Noting the frequency with which conflicts
over power have arisen between the executive and the legislative
branches of government, the Gillock court dismissed the govern-
ment's contention that the separation of powers into three coequal
branches obviates the need for legislative privilege. 9 The court sug-
gested that federal prosecutorial authority could be misused against
dissident state legislators as easily as against Congressmen." Since
this would have a detrimental effect on legislative independence,
outset, Judge Gibbons emphasized that the determination that the subpoenaed records did
not fall within the ambit of "legislative acts or speech" was sufficient to obviate further
consideration of the issue of the existence of a privilege. Id. at 586 (Gibbons, J., concurring).
Judge Gibbons also was disturbed by the majority's failure to define adequately the scope of
the privilege recognized. Id. at 586-87 (Gibbons, J., concurring). He criticized the endorse-
ment of the privilege on the basis that its supposed beneficial aspect, the increased freedom
of expression in the legislature, was far outweighed by its detrimental effect on federal law
enforcement. Id. at 587 (Gibbons, J., concurring). Insofar as the claimed privilege was not
necessary to protect confidentiality and since a similar privilege had not been recognized to
protect the state judiciary, the concurring judge felt that the endorsement of a common-law
speech or debate privilege for state legislators was unwarranted. Id. at 588 (Gibbons, J.,
concurring).
u 587 F.2d 284 (6th Cir. 1978), cert. granted, 99 S.Ct. 2159 (1979).
15 Id. at 286; see 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (1976).
587 F.2d at 286; see note 13 supra.
587 F.2d at 286.
Id. at 290.
Id. at 286. Rather than contending that there is no separation of powers controversy
where the action involves the federal prosecution of a state official, see Craig, 528 F.2d at
783 (Tone, J., concurring), the prosecution in Gillock claimed that the separation of powers
completely eliminates the need for the privilege. This argument appears to be diametrically
opposed to the well-established proposition that one of the essential functions of the speech
or debate clause is to preserve the constitutional delineation of powers. See, e.g., Eastland v.
United States Servicemen's Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 502 (1975); Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306,
311 (1973); Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 616 (1972); United States v. Brewster, 408
U.S. 501, 508 (1972); United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169, 182 (1966).
11 587 F.2d at 286; see notes 129-30 and accompanying text infra.
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the court found it necessary to adopt a federal common-law privi-
lege.91
In a vigorous dissent, Judge Weick criticized the recognition of
a common-law speech or debate privilege as contrary to the weight
of prior circuit court authority and detrimental to the judicial pro-
cess of ascertaining the truth.92 Contending that the justification for
the privilege exists only where the conflict is between coordinate
branches of a single government, 3 Judge Weick stated that, since
there is no separation of powers controversy between a state legisla-
tor and the federal government, "a federal common law speech or
debate privilege cannot logically exist."94 The dissent also noted
that the sole protection enjoyed by a state legislator in a federal
cause of action is the doctrine of official immunity. 5 Since the doc-
trine provides no immunity from liability in a criminal case, he
continued, neither should there exist an evidentiary privilege. 6
Finding no history of abuse in this country that warranted the crea-
tion of a common-law speech or debate privilege,7 Judge Weick
" 587 F.2d at 290. Although affirming the lower court on the existence of a privilege, the
sixth circuit held that certain evidence suppressed by the district court did not fall within
the scope of the privilege and hence modified the decision accordingly. Id. at 294. The Gillock
majority measured the extent of the protection afforded by the common-law privilege in
accordance with the views of the Supreme Court concerning the scope of the constitutional
speech or debate clause. Id. at 292-94 (quoting Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 625-26
(1972); United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 512-13, 515-16 & n.10 (1972); United States
v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169, 172, 185 (1966)).
92 587 F.2d at 294-96 (Weick, J., dissenting).
'3 Id. at 296-97 (Weick, J., dissenting).
" Id. at 297 (Weick, J., dissenting). According to the dissent, an indication that a com-
mon-law privilege should not be recognized is discernible from the Supreme Court's dis-
parate treatment of attempts to obtain injunctions against federal and state legislators. Id.
Judge Weick noted that, while injunctive relief is precluded by the speech or debate clause
when the defendant is a member of Congress, see Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969),
the activity of a state legislator has been enjoined without discussion of the speech or debate
privilege on analogous facts, see Bond v. Floyd, 385 U.S. 116 (1966). See also Jordan v.
Hutcheson, 323 F.2d 597 (4th Cir. 1963); Bush v. Orleans Parish School Bd., 191 F. Supp.
871 (E.D. La.), aff'd per curiam sub nom. Denny v. Bush, 367 U.S. 908 (1961). It is submitted,
however, that this argument presumes either that the defendants in Bond raised the issue
of speech or debate privilege, or that in the absence of the assertion of the privilege the
Court considered this defense sua sponte. Neither presumption is tenable. The district court
opinion in Bond, 251 F. Supp. 333 (N.D. Ga. 1966), from which an immediate appeal was
taken to the Supreme Court, does not indicate that the defendants raised the issue of the
applicability of the speech or debate protection. Neither the lower court nor the Supreme
Court mentioned a privilege. Consequently, it is submitted that the success of the plaintiff
in Bond is not indicative of the Court's disposition of the issue whether a common-law
privilege exists.




stated that the existence of procedural safeguards in criminal prose-
cutions sufficiently minimizes the possibility that the federal gov-
ernment could infringe upon the independence of state legislators.98
It also was maintained that, since the federal government is empow-
ered to prosecute state legislators for violations of federal law, the
refusal to recognize the purported common-law privilege would not
substantially increase federal power over state legislators.99 Judge
Weick concluded that no federal common-law immunity should be
acknowledged because it would allow "state legislators to avoid with
impunity federal criminal liability for their official acts."'' 0
THE CASE IN FAVOR OF THE COMMON LAW PRIVILEGE
The Competing Privileges: Speech or Debate and Official Immunity
Those who oppose the recognition of a common-law speech or
debate privilege maintain that, under Tenney v. Brandhove, the
only protection available to a state legislator in a federal criminal
action is afforded by the common-law doctrine of official immun-
ity. 10 Specifically, they contend that the evidentiary privilege de-
pends upon the existence of an underlying immunity, and since
there is no official immunity from criminal liability, no evidentiary
privilege can exist in a criminal case.0 2
Initially, it is submitted that the narrow holding in Tenney
should not be read to bar every protection but "official immunity."
Tenney, which arguably was not a speech or debate case,103 merely
' Id. But see note 132 infra.
" 587 F.2d at 299 (Weick, J., dissenting). Judge Weick maintained that, owing to the
numerous policy questions, recognition of a common-law speech or debate privilege would
raise, id.; see In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 563 F.2d 577, 586-87 (3d Cir. 1977), the wiser
approach would be to let Congress decide the issue, 587 F.2d at 299 (Weick, J., dissenting).
'0' 587 F.2d at 299 (Weick, J., dissenting).
101 Gillock, 587 F.2d at 297-98 (Weick, J., dissenting); DiCarlo, 565 F.2d at 806; In re
Grand Jury Proceedings, 563 F.2d at 587 (Gibbons, J., concurring); Craig, 528 F.2d at 782
(Tone, J., concurring). Two commentators have criticized the conclusion that Tenney limits
a state legislator's protection in federal court to the official immunity doctrine, which can be
invoked only in civil actions. See Comment, 8 RuT.-CAui. L.J. 550, 553 (1977); Comment, 45
U. CIN. L. REv. 325, 329 (1976). It also has been suggested that the failure of the Tenney Court
to mention prior official immunity cases in its discussion, forecloses the presumption that the
basis of the privilege conferred by the Court was the doctrine of official immunity. See
Comment, 8 RuT.-CAMA. L.J. 550, 553 (1977). It is submitted, however, that since Tenney was
a civil case, the narrowness of the holding makes it difficult to reject categorically the conclu-
sion that the basis of the privilege conferred in Tenney was the doctrine of official immunity.
Whether Tenney is categorized as an official immunity case does not prevent the recognition
of a common-law speech or debate privilege. See notes 107-08 and accompanying text infra.
,o2 See cases cited at note 104 supra.
10 United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 516 n.10 (1972).
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stands for the proposition that Congress did not abolish the tradi-
tional insulation of legislators from civil liability in adopting the
Civil Rights Acts.'0 Tenney did not hold, nor has the Supreme
Court ever indicated, that the extent of a state legislator's protec-
tion from federal liability is limited to the civil immunity afforded
by the official immunity doctrine. °5 Moreover, the argument that
the existence of an evidentiary privilege is foreclosed because the
doctrine of official immunity furnishes no protection in criminal
prosecutions' 8 ignores the subtle distinctions between the two con-
cepts. The principle of official immunity exempts government offi-
cers from any civil liability arising out of the performance of their
official duties.'" As a result of this immunity, no evidentiary privi-
lege need be extended to the protected official because no civil ac-
tion may be brought against him for conduct within the scope of his
authority. ' On the other hand, the common-law and constitutional
speech or debate privilege is evidentiary in nature.' °9 In its applica-
tion, the privilege prohibits a legislative act from being the subject
of inquiry outside the legislative chamber.'10 Nevertheless, the legis-
lator still may be prosecuted for- an underlying criminal offense,
104 341 U.S. 367, 376 (1951); see Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 316 (1975); Craig, 528
F.2d at 782 (Tone, J., concurring).
"I In United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169 (1966), the Supreme Court stated: "[Tihe
[Tenney] Court . . . viewed the state legislative privilege as being on a parity with the
similar federal privilege . . . ." Id. at 180. Despite this arguably significant interpretation of
Tenney, only the first circuit in DiCarlo has taken note of it but the Court stated that "it
[would] be reading too much into the [Johnson] Court's language . . . to say it meant that
the state privilege is on a full parity with that of Congress." 565 F.2d at 806 n.5.
In his concurring opinion in Craig, Judge Tone stated that recent Supreme Court pro-
nouncements "have made it clear" that a state legislator's protection is limited to the doc-
trine of official immunity. 528 F.2d at 782 (Tone, J., concurring). Although the cases cited
by the concurring Judge may indicate that the legislator in Tenney was protected by the
doctrine of official immunity, none specify that Tenney limited a state legislator's protection
to official immunity. For example, in Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975), the Court
stated that Tenney held "that there was no basis for believing that Congress intended to
eliminate the traditional immunity of legislators from civil lijbility. . . ... Id. at 316; accord,
Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 243-44 (1974) (quoting Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367,
379 (1951); Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306, 320 (1973); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554
(1967)). Thus, the Supreme Court's recognition of a common-law speech or debate privilege
would not be inconsistent with prior authority.
,04 Gillock, 587 F.2d at 298 (Weick, J., dissenting); DiCarlo, 565 F.2d at 807; Craig, 528
F.2d at 782-83 (Tone, J., concurring).
,0, See notes 9-11 and accompanying text supra.
See generally Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 572 (1959); W. PROSSER, LAW OF ToRTS
§ 132 (4th ed. 1971).
,o' See note 5 and accompanying text supra.
,,0 U.S. CONST. art I, § 6, cl. 1; see United States v. Helstoski, 99 S.Ct. 2432, 2438-39
(1979); United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 512 (1972).
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provided the prosecution does not call into question his legislative
conduct." Indeed, the Supreme Court frequently has noted that the
speech or debate clause of the United States Constitution furnishes
a privilege against evidentiary use, even in the absence of a substan-
tive immunity.' Similarly, it would seem that the recognition of a
common-law speech or debate privilege does not depend on the
existence of an underlying immunity.
Defining the Purpose of the Speech or Debate Privilege
It has been suggested that the purpose of the speech or debate
privilege is not merely to secure legislative independence, but, more
importantly, to preserve the separation of powers among coequal
branches of a single government."' The proponents of this view
claim that, since there are no balance of power problems when a
state legislator is prosecuted by the federal executive, there is no
justification for creating a common-law speech or debate privi-
lege."' It is submitted, however, that this argument misinterprets
the historical backgrouid and the Supreme Court's construction of
the speech or debate clause of the United States Constitution.
The Supreme Court apparently has accorded equal weight to
both legislative independence and maintaining the separation of
powers as justifications for the constitutional speech or debate privi-
lege." 5 As noted by the Court in United States v. Brewster: "Our
speech or debate privilege was designed to preserve legislative inde-
pendence, not supremacy. Our task, therefore, is to apply the
Clause in such a way as to insure the independence of the legislature
without altering the historic balance of the three co-equal branches
of government.""' 8 Admittedly, separation of powers among the
branches of the federal government was an important factor in the
adoption of the constitutional clause." 7 Yet, notwithstanding the
M See United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 512 (1972); United States v. Johnson,
383 U.S. 169, 185 (1966).
"I E.g., United States v. Helstoski, 99 S.Ct. 2432, 2438-40 (1979); United States v.
Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 512 (1972); United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169, 185 (1966).
"I See Gillock, 587 F.2d at 297 (Weick, J., dissenting) (quoting Gravel v. United States,
408 U.S. 606, 616, 617 (1972)); Craig, 528 F.2d at 783 (Tone, J., concurring) (quoting Gravel
v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 616, 617 (1972)).
"I See Gillock, 587 F.2d at 297 (Weick, J., dissenting); Craig, 528 F.2d at 783 (Tone, J.,
concurring).
" See Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 616, 618 (1972); United States v. Brewster,
408 U.S. 501, 508 (1972).
"' United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 508 (1972).
"z The Johnson Court stated that the privilege originated "to prevent intimidation by
the executive and accountability before a possibly hostile judiciary." 383 U.S. at 181.
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absence of the question in a federal prosecution of a state legislator,
the independence and integrity of the state legislature and its mem-
bers are fundamentally at issue.118
Freedom of legislative speech and debate was considered so
indispensable to the effective functioning of the law-making branch
that, not only was it incorporated into the United States Constitu-
tion, but it also has been guaranteed by the overwhelming majority
of state constitutions."' Thus, a basic tenet of American govern-
ment would seem to be that all legislators are able to speak and act
without fear of criminal or civil litigation.' 20 While most legislators
are insulated from state prosecutorial intimidation by state consti-
tutional privileges,12' they have no similar protection concerning
federal criminal charges without a federal common-law speech or
debate privilege.1 2 Through its power to initiate and prosecute crim-
inal proceedings, the federal executive has the unique and formid-
able capacity to harass and intimidate critical state legislators.123
Consequently, the failure to recognize a common-law speech or de-
bate privilege may seriously jeopardize the effective functioning of
state legislatures by subjecting the legislators to the threat of federal
prosecutorial authority. '2 It is submitted that this potential for mis-
use of federal executive power against state legislators would emas-
culate the protection of the state privilege provisions.'2 Indeed,
there is historical support1 21 for the Gillock majority's observation
-, See In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 563 F.2d 577, 579 (3d Cir. 1977). In Craig, the
Government conceded that failure to recognize the common-law privilege "would have an
inhibiting effect on the [state legislator's] conduct." 528 F.2d at 778.
,, Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 372-75 (1951); see note 7 supra.
, Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 375 (1951); see note 129 infra.
121 See note 7 and accompanying text supra.
12 See notes 12-13 and accompanying text supra.
812 See United States v. Mandel, 415 F. Supp. 1025, 1029 (D. Md. 1976).
"A See generally United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169, 179 (1966); McGovern v. Martz,
182 F. Supp. 343, 346 (D.D.C. 1960).
I's As the majority in the Craig panel decision noted, "[t]he evil is the fact of deterrence;
whether the threat emanates from the local or national executive makes no difference." 528
F.2d at 778.
The argument that the common-law privilege need not be recognized because the powers
of the federal executive and judiciary could only be brought to bear on state legislators when
a federal criminal violation is involved mistakes the wide range of criminal activity covered
by federal statutes such as the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (1976), under which defendants
Gillock, Craig, and DiCarlo were indicted.
21 587 F.2d at 286. A recent example of executive abuse of power is the list of "White
House enemies" maintained by former President Nixon. See N.Y. Times, June 28, 1973, at
1, col. 5. The admitted policy for keeping the list was to "use the available federal machinery
to [retaliate against] our political enemies." Id. Two suggested means were litigation and
prosecution. See 25 NAT'L REV. 858 (1973). History also shows that the fear of trial before a
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that "[ilt is easy to conceive of the abuse of federal prosecutorial
power against members of state legislatures of an opposite political
persuasion."' Moreover, to conclude that the privilege only has
relevance where there is a separation of powers conflict appears to
ignore the clause's relevance where the action is in the nature of a
private civil suit.12s It is contended, therefore, that the absence of a
separation of powers conflict in federal prosecutions of state legisla-
tors neither forecloses the existence of nor eliminates the need for a
federal common-law speech or debate privilege. 29
A Common-Law Speech or Debate Privilege in a Federal System of
Government
As the Supreme Court has noted, it is imperative that the
speech or debate privilege be interpreted in light of the American
federal system of government. 3 By virtue of our federalism, the
"hostile judiciary," see United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169, 181 (1966), is not unfounded.
See generally Reinstein & Silverglate, supra note 2, at 1141-43.
1" 587 F.2d at 286. The absence of a history of abuse of federal prosecutorial power
against state legislators does not justify failing to recognize a common-law speech or debate
privilege. The Brewster Court stated: "It does not undermine the validity of the Framers'
concern for the independence of the Legislative Branch to acknowledge that our history does
not reflect a catalogue of abuses at the hands of the Executive that gave rise to the privilege
in England." United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 508 (1972); accord, United States v.
Johnson, 383 U.S. 169, 182 (1966).
212 The Supreme Court has noted that a private civil suit operates "to delay and disrupt
the legislative function." Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 503
(1975). Consequently, the Court has not suggested that the purposes served by the clause are
significant only where the action has overtones of a separation of powers controversy. Id. at
502. Rather, in a private civil suit the Court stated that the clause exists to protect the
legislator from the burden of having to defend himself. Dombrowski v. Eastland, 387 U.S.
82, 85 (1967). It is submitted that the Dombrowski Court was more concerned with relieving
legislators from this burden than securing the separation of powers since the potential for
judicial intimidation is minimal. Indeed, as the Gravel Court noted: "The Speech or Debate
Clause was designed to assure a co-equal branch of the government wide freedom of speech,
debate, and deliberation without intimidation or threats from the Executive Branch." Gravel
v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 616 (1972) (emphasis added).
I" Neither the first amendment rights nor procedural safeguards available to all criminal
defendants should obviate the need to recognize a federal common-law speech or debate
privilege. It is not only the fear of the consequences of the litigation that may inhibit a
legislator from functioning effectively, but also the stigma that accompanies criminal charges
and the attendant burden of preparing and presenting a defense. See generally Eastland v.
United States Servicemen's Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 513 (1975) (Marshall, J., concurring).
I United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 508 (1972); see note 116 and accompanying
text supra; Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 502 (1975). Unlike
England where the Parliament is omnipotent, A. Dicsy, THE LAW OF THE CONSTrrUTmoN 40
(10th ed. 1960); Q. HOGG, THE PURPOSE OF PAiu ENrr 52 (1946), the legislature in the United
States is neither supreme nor unitary. The English governmental structure also differs from
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states possess sovereign powers in areas not within the exclusive
domain of Congress.' Thus, the federal government cannot be
deemed supreme nor more important than the state governments in
all respects.'32 It is submitted, therefore, that the same policy con-
siderations proffered to justify the existence of the constitutional
speech or debate clause similarly warrant the acknowledgement of
a common-law privilege to protect state legislators.'33 Although the
privilege increases the possibility that state legislators will violate
federal criminal law with impunity, this risk always has existed as
an unfortunate incident to legislative privilege but did not deter the
Framers of the Constitution from adopting the privilege.'34 It was a
the American system, see note 131 infra, in that legislative power in its entirety is vested in
the Parliament, A DICEY, supra, at 39-40.
-3' See U.S. CONST. amend. X; Levi, Some Aspects of Separation of Powers, 76 COLUM.
L. RE v. 371, 376 (1976). The tenth amendment provides: "The powers not delegated to the
United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the
States respectively, or to the people." U.S. CONST. amend. X. Thus, state legislatures may
exercise lawmaking power not by virtue of a delegation of federal legislative power but as a
function of state sovereignty. Lane County v. Oregon, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 71, 76 (1868); McCul-
loch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 410 (1819); Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386,
387 (1798); see National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 845 (1976).
In See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 410 (1819). The principle that
state governments perform a function equal in importance to that performed by the federal
government was recognized by Thomas Jefferson. In a letter to William Johnson he wrote, "I
believe the States can best govern our home concerns, and the general government our foreign
ones." Letter from Thomas Jefferson to William Johnson (June 12, 1823), reprinted in 10 P.
FORD, THE WRrriNGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 232 (1899).
It is submitted that federal prosecutorial and judicial incursions into state legislative
domain would violate the vital consideration of federal-state comity. This concept, recently
discussed by the Supreme Court in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971), connotes "a
proper respect for state functions" and requires that, in endeavoring to preserve and protect
federal rights, the national government should attempt "to do so in ways that will not unduly
interfere with the legitimate activities of the States." Id.
It is submitted that the DiCarlo Court misconstrued the import of the concept of comity
when it concluded that the relationship between the federal and state governments did not
supersede the federal prosecutor's need for evidence. 565 F.2d at 806 (citations omitted). As
the Supreme Court established in Younger, it is the state's interest, in this case preserving
the integrity and independence of the legislature, see United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501,
507 (1972), and not merely the federal-state relationship, that must be weighed against the
corresponding interest of the federal government. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44
(1971). It appears that a common-law speech or debate privilege is needed to ensure that the
States can "function effectively in a federal system," National League of Cities v. Usery, 426
U.S. 833, 843 (1976), and to guarantee a proper respect for state sovereignty.
I" At least one scholar has stated that a common-law protection for legislators "exists
independent[ly] of [a constitutional] declaration as a necessary principle in free govern-
ment. . . ." T. COOLEY, TORTS § 119, at 229 (stud. ed. 1907); see Note, "They Shall Not Be
Questioned . . .", 3 STAN. L. REv. 486, 493 (1951).
"' The Brewster Court noted that the constitutional clause has "enabled reckless men
to slander and even destroy others with impunity, but that was the conscious choice of the
Framers." 408 U.S. at 516.
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conscious determination that it would be better to tolerate the
abuses than to compromise the essential integrity of the law-making
body by exposing legislators to the threat of civil or criminal liabil-
ity.1r Furthermore, the Supreme Court's recent constriction of the
scope of the constitutional privilege to that which is absolutely nec-
essary to preserve legislative independence reduces the potential for
misuse.'36 The extent of the common-law privilege presumably
would be equally circumscribed.
Additionally, the speech or debate clause of the Constitution
does not completely exempt legislative activity from review, but
dictates that "for any Speech or Debate . . .[congressmen] shall
not be questioned in any other Place. ,,3 Hence, the speech or de-
bate clause merely limits the locus of the reviewing forum to the
legislature itself.'1 Despite the criticisms of the legislature as not
being a suitable tribunal for the criminal trial of its members, 3 ,
whatever problems exist conceivably could be overcome.'40 The for-
mulation of a federal common-law speech or debate privilege for
state legislators hopefully will encourage state legislatures to de-
velop efficient procedures to deal with the criminal conduct of mem-
bers.' Even if this does not occur, it should not militate against
recognizing a common-law privilege, since misuse historically has
been viewed as the necessary cost of realizing the vital benefits of
the speech or debate privilege.'
'" United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 516 (1972); see generally Tenney v. Brand-
hove, 341 U.S. 367, 375 & n.4 (1951).
'' See notes 57-58 and accompanying text supra.
'n U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 1 (emphasis added).
'' United States v. Helstoski, 99 S.Ct. 2432, 2439 (1979); see United States v. Brewster,
408 U.S. 501, 563 (1972) (White, J., dissenting); Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 378
(1951); Cochran v. Couzens, 42 F.2d 783, 784 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 282 U.S. 874 (1930).
The Constitution provides that "[e]ach House may determine the Rules of its Proceedings,
punish its Members for disorderly Behavior, and, with the Concurrence of two thirds, expel
a Member." U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 5, cl.2. In Kilboum v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168 (1881), the
Court stated that Congress was empowered to punish disorderly members by imprisonment.
Id. at 189-90. Nevertheless, Congress has never imprisoned a legislator. See Cella, supra note
2, at 39-40.
'1 United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501 (1972). The Brewster Court stated that
"Congress is ill-equipped to investigate, try and punish its Members." Id. at 518. See
generally Note, The Bribed Congressman's Immunity From Prosecution, 75 YALE L.J. 335,
348-49 (1965).
0 Cella, supra note 2, at 41.
"I In his dissenting opinion in United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501 (1972), Justice
White suggested that the Houses of Congress "develop their own institutions and procedures
for dealing with those in their midst who would prostitute the legislative process." Id. at 563
(White, J., dissenting); accord, Cella, supra note 40, at 1088.
"I See Celia, supra note 2, at 40.
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CONCLUSION
The doctrine of legislative privilege of speech or debate has
developed in large part to compensate for the unique susceptibility
of the legislature to intimidation by the executive and judiciary.
Despite the potential for abuse, the privilege has been recognized
as essential to the effective operation of representative government,
insofar as it preserves the independence and the integrity of the law-
making body. Clearly, the recognition of a common-law speech or
debate privilege is not precluded by past Supreme Court decisions.
Moreover, our federal system, characterized by the apportionment
of executive, legislative and judicial functions between a local and
a national government, demands the independence of state legisla-
tors who perform functions no less vital than those performed by
federal legislators. The need to enforce federal criminal law should
not compromise this integrity. It is suggested, therefore, that it is
incumbent upon the Supreme Court to recognize a federal common-
law privilege essentially commensurate in scope with the constitu-
tional speech or debate clause in order to prevent the type of federal
intimidation of state legislators that would undermine the inde-
pendence of the law-making branch of state governments.
Richard V. Silver
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